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Abstract. In this paper, we present a hybrid approach for buffer over-
flow detection in C code. The approach makes use of static and dynamic
analysis of the application under investigation. The static part consists
in calculating taint dependency sequences (TDS) between user controlled
inputs and vulnerable statements. This process is akin to program slice of
interest to calculate tainted data- and control-flow path which exhibits
the dependence between tainted program inputs and vulnerable state-
ments in the code. The dynamic part consists of executing the program
along TDSs to trigger the vulnerability by generating suitable inputs. We
use genetic algorithm to generate inputs. We propose a fitness function
that approximates the program behavior (control flow) based on the fre-
quencies of the statements along TDSs. This runtime aspect makes the
approach faster and accurate. We provide experimental results on the
Verisec benchmark to validate our approach.
1 Introduction
1.1 Context
In a recent report, published by Veracode [27], it is pointed out that a high
percentage of commercial and open source softwares is written in C/C++ and
thereby, making them highly susceptible to many dangerous attacks. Under this
category of C/C++, buffer overflow (BoF) tops the list with 32% of the total
vulnerabilities. In the present work, we focus on BoF vulnerability in C code.
There have been numerous studies in the literature to detect the presence of BoF
in applications [8][30]. These studies can broadly be categorized under static and
dynamic code analysis approaches. Both of the approaches have their pros and
cons.
Static code analysis is capable of analyzing all the possible paths from the
tainted source to potentially vulnerable statements. However, it may produce
false positives when dealing with complex language constructs or non trivial
sanitization functions. It is also sensitive to the artifacts introduced by the com-
piler. For example, an off-by-one error can be detected by a static source code
analyzer, but its actual exploitability will be known only after the compilation.
On the contrary, Dynamic analysis can be very accurate in vulnerability
detection, but it faces a hard time in finding paths that activate the vulnerability.
The discipline of generating inputs that trigger a vulnerability is termed as
fuzzing [20]. Fuzzing can be completely random or intelligent [25][9]. In the later
case, a possible approach is to use a symbolic execution technique to produce a
list of constraints that should be satisfied in order to execute a given path (the
so-called path-condition). These path constraints are presented to a constraint
solver to get some possible inputs that satisfy them. However, the obtained
results highly depend on the solver’s efficiency. An alternative approach consists
in re-phrasing the input generation as a search problem, that can be solved using
dedicated techniques like genetic algorithms [19].
1.2 Our proposal
In this paper we propose a hybrid approach to detect BoF vulnerabilities. First,
a static code analysis is used to generate Taint Dependency Sequences (TDS)
representing a subset of tainted paths leading to a potential vulnerability. Then,
a dynamic analysis is used to generate concrete inputs allowing to execute one of
these paths. This dynamic part relies on a genetic algorithm. The fitness function
that we use associates a score to each current input according to the runtime
dynamics of the application: each obtained execution trace is compared with the
TDS that we target, and a next generation of inputs is produced from the best
individuals. This fitness function makes use of the so-called frequency spectrum
of statements introduced in [3].
A high level diagram of our approach is depicted in Fig. 1. STAC is the static
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Fig. 1. A high level flow diagram representing various components of hybrid approach
analysis component of the approach. It generates TDSs by performing taint data-
flow analysis. Based on this information, the source code is instrumented in order
to collect the execution traces produced by running the program. The dynamic
component, called TAGA (TDS Assisted Genetic Algorithm, shown in dotted
box), is then used to generate inputs as described above. As we are targeting
BoF vulnerability, TAGA keeps generating inputs until we get a program crash,
or until some threshold is reached in the number of iterations performed by the
genetic algorithm. When a crash is obtained, we run the binary with a debug-
ger to collect information about various internal structures (e.g., the execution
stack). This information will provide some useful hints about the severity of the
vulnerability: depending on the content of the execution stack, we can infer how
easy it is to write an exploit for this vulnerability. Thus our approach shows not
only the presence of the vulnerability but also its feasibility of exploitation in
real world.
The main contributions of the approach are:
– Automated malicious input generation;
– Robust taint data-flow based execution path generation, thereby reducing
search path. This point separates our approach from the ones based on code
coverage;
– New runtime program behavior based fitness function;
– Hints on the level of exploitability of a particular vulnerability.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly describe
the static analysis component STAC. We elaborate on TAGA and its various
components including fitness function in section 3. Section 4 presents the imple-
mentation details and some experiments performed on benchmark data. Section
5 walks over the existing literature to report relevant work and provides discus-
sion in relation to our results. We conclude in section 6 by providing summary
and future extension of the approach.
2 Taint Dependency Sequence
As quoted in the introduction, one of the main difficulties when using search
based algorithms for vulnerability detection is to identify the part of the program
that needs to be covered during the search. In this section, we describe the static
analysis component that we use in our approach to automate this task.
From a security point of view, a program execution sequence can be consid-
ered as “dangerous” if it allows some user inputs to (directly or indirectly) ac-
tivate a (potentially) vulnerable statement, like an array access. Tracking these
dependencies between program inputs and vulnerable statements can be ob-
tained by means of a well-established technique called taint analysis.
Roughly speaking, taint analysis consists in assigning a taint information
to a variable v at each program location l if the value of v at this location
may depend on an external input. Consider for instance the example (taken
from [28]) shown in Listing. 1.1 which serves as working example through out
the remaining article. This program takes two string arguments as input, called
gecos and login. It builds a result string (buf) by transforming the gecos
argument as follows: each occurrence of character “&” found before either a “,”,
“;”, “%” or “\0” character is substituted with the login argument.
1 void bui ldfname ( char ∗gecos , char ∗ log in , char ∗buf )
2 {
3 char ∗bp = buf ;
4 char∗ p ;
5 for (p = gecos ; ∗p != ’ \0 ’ && ∗p != ’ , ’ &&
6 ∗p != ’ ; ’ && ∗p != ’%’ ; p++) {
7 i f (∗p == ’&’ ) {
8 (void ) s tr cpy (bp , l og i n ) ; /∗ BAD ∗/
9 ∗bp = toupper (∗bp ) ;
10 while (∗bp != ’\0 ’ )
11 bp++;
12 } e lse {
13 ∗bp++ = ∗p ; /∗ BAD ∗/
14 }
15 }
16 ∗bp = ’\0 ’ ; /∗ BAD ∗/
17 }
18 int main ( int argc , char ∗∗argv )
19 {
20 char ∗gecos , ∗ lo g in , buf [ 5 1 2 ] ;
21 gecos=argv [ 1 ] ;
22 l og i n=argv [ 2 ] ;
23 bui ldfname ( gecos , l og in , buf ) ;
24 return 0 ;
25 }
Listing 1.1. buildfname simplified vulnerable function
In this program, parameters gecos and login are tainted at location 21 and
22 (since they depend on command line arguments). This taint information is
propagated to variables p and bp, both by data dependency (through explicit
assignments) and control dependency (since these variables are assigned within
an iteration controlled by an expression depending on gecos).
In [6], we proposed a static analysis approach which associates a taint en-
vironment to each variable v, at each program location l. In addition to taint
information, this environment also associates to each pair (l, v) a set of TDS
explaining why the variable v is tainted at location l. More precisely, each TDS
t =< l1, l2, . . . , ln > is a sequence of program locations li a program execution
path should traverse in order to reach l with an input-dependent value assigned
to v. Thus, when l corresponds to a vulnerable statement, this TDS set exactly
characterizes the set of “dangerous” execution paths.
In the buildfname example depicted in Listing. 1.1, 3 vulnerable statements
can be identified (lines 8, 13 and 16). Indeed, in each of these statements a write
access to a buffer buf is performed on a (potentially) tainted address that might
overflow the buffer. The TDS sets associated with these locations corresponds to
all the execution paths that may activate these vulnerabilities (i.e., reach them
with a tainted address)1.
Let us consider, for instance, the vulnerability at line 8. At this location,
variable bp can be tainted in several ways, e.g.:
– *bp is assigned p (at location 13), which was assigned the tainted value gecos
(location 5). The corresponding TDS, therefore, is < 21, 5, 13, 8 >.
– bp is assigned within iteration loops controlled by a tainted value (location
5 and 10). Corresponding TDS are < 21, 5, 13, 8 > or < 22, 8, 10, 11, 8 >
1 Since these TDS are computed statically some of these paths may be infeasible.
3 Genetic Algorithm Based Input Generation
In this section, we briefly introduce the topic of genetic algorithm used in the
TAGA component. Genetic algorithm (GA, for short) is the member of family
of search-based algorithms known as evolutionary algorithms [18]. GA is based
on the idea of human evolution i.e. survival of the fittest. Following steps are
involved in a typical GA based solution to a problem:
1. Based on the problem, an initial population of candidate solutions (inputs)
is generated randomly.
2. A fitness function is defined to evaluate each candidate solution (i.e. its
proximity to the target solution).
3. Crossover and mutation are applied to parents (old generation) to create
children (new inputs).
4. A selection strategy is applied to generate new population based on fitness
score.
The pseudo-code of GA is given in listing: 1.2 (taken from [18]). In the follow-
ing sections, we describe GA components with respect to our implementation.
Genetic algorithm is used to generate inputs that cause tainted path (i.e. TDS)
to be executed. Indeed, the purpose of a TDS t =< l1, l2, . . . , ln > is to “guide”
the program execution towards a vulnerability along a path traversing each li.
The idea is to run the vulnerable program with initial inputs and then by using
GA generate new inputs that not only traverse a given TDS but also cause the
program to misbehave, for example causing crash.
1 pops iz e := des i r ed populat i on s i z e
2 P := [ ]
3 for pops i z e times do
4 P := P U <new random ind iv idua l s>
5 Best := [ ]
6 repeat
7 for each i nd iv i du a l Pi in P do
8 Asse s sF i tn e s s ( Pi )
9 i f Best ==[] or Fi tne s s ( Pi ) > F itne s s ( Best ) then
10 Best := Pi
11 Q := [ ]
12 for pops i ze /2 times do
13 Parent Pa := SelectwithReplacement (P)
14 Parent Pb := SelectwithReplacement (P)
15 Chi ldren Ca , Cb := Crossover (Copy (Pa) , Copy (Pb) )
16 Q := P U <Mutate (Ca) , Mutate (Cb)>
17 P := Q
18 un t i l Best i s the i d e a l s o l u t i o n OR we have run out of time
19 return Best
Listing 1.2. Pseudo–code for Genetic Algorithm
3.1 Initial Population
As mentioned before, in order to execute a TDS a set of constraints (corre-
sponding to the IF and WHILE conditions associated to this TDS) has to be
satisfied. When these conditions are character comparisons, this implies that
the (string) inputs should pass these comparisons. Therefore, based on static
analysis of the source code, performed during TDS computation, we collect in-
formation on program inputs and corresponding path conditions. For the pro-
gram, shown in Fig. 1.1, path conditions are in the form of comparisons with
particular characters belonging to the set C = (′&′,′ ,′ ,′ ;′ ). With this infor-
mation, we construct regular expression to represent the input and thereupon,
generate strings that satisfy that regular expression. In our example, we use
[a-z$%;,@#&$0-9A-Z]{16,32},which matches strings of length between 16 and
32 characters including the ones belonging to C. The set of such inputs consti-
tutes our initial population2. In each generation, we maintain 30 individuals.
3.2 Fitness Function
As aforementioned, our aim is to traverse a given TDS, which may contain nodes
responsible for path conditions. We should prefer inputs that traverse through
maximum number of such nodes. Based on this criteria, we assign weights to
each of the elements belonging to a selected TDS. Our fitness function Fi of i
th
input (i ∈ I, set of inputs) is defined as follows:
Fi =
k∑
j=1
wj × fij (1)
where wj ∈ W corresponds to the weight associated with lj ∈ t and fij is the
frequency of lj for i ∈ I. W is the set of weights for each TDS t. Selection of
appropriate values for W is of paramount importance for our fitness function to
yield good results. For example, if we choose to select equal weights for each tjs,
and there is a nested structure in the program such that one (or more) lj is at
inner most nested statement, then it will be executed lesser times, as compared
to lj at outer most statements. As a result, inputs which are reaching till outer
statements only will have a high fitness values, thereby giving GA a wrong fitness
impression. Therefore, for such situation, we need to assign a higher weight to the
inner one as compared to the outer one. To tackle this issue, we have following
two approaches to work upon.
Static Approach While calculating TDS, STAC also learns IsNested type of
structure among ljs. For example, for any two l1, l2 ∈ t, we may learn that l1
and l2 are in a same nested conditional statements structure and l1 lies at upper
level than l2 in the hierarchy. Therefore, if we have this information from TDS,
we can assign relative weights such that inner ljs have higher weights than outer
ones.
Dynamic Approach A careful runtime analysis reveals a lot about execution
trace of the program by means of frequencies corresponding to ljs. In [3][2][22]
the authors discuss the dynamic analysis of program by means of frequency
spectrum analysis. In particular, by observing the frequencies of statements,
branching structure can be approximated to some extent. As discussed in above
section, it may be noted that rare execution statements will have low frequencies
as compared to easily executed ones. It may also be noted that statements lie
2 Currently, we are experimenting with string type inputs only.
deep inside a nested structure belong to rare statements. Therefore, frequency
spectrum of ljs captures IsNested type of structure among ljs. To calculate
frequency spectrum, we start with a set of inputs I := 〈i1, i2, ..., im〉 to get a
frequency matrix freq =
(
···
fij
···
)
, where fij is the frequency of lj for the input
i ∈ I. As we are counting frequencies of each lj, a given tds t is simplified
further by removing duplicate ljs, keeping only the first occurrence of lj . Based
on the above assumption, we calculate weights dynamically by counting global
frequencies of ljs and inverting them i.e. for a set of inputs I and the matrix
freq, the weight wj of lj is calculated as follows:
wj =
1
m∑
i=1
fij
(2)
We make another observation while calculating weights. Labels in TDS, which
are closer to vulnerable statement i.e. the last element of a TDS, should have
more weights than the ones which are relatively away from vulnerable statement.
This is because any input which is reaching nearer to vulnerable statement has
greater chance of reaching the vulnerable statement. Given this, we multiply
weights with a function whose value increases as we move from beginning to end
in a TDS. One example of such function may be the index of the elements in
the TDS i.e. for lj ∈ t, the function value will be j. We denote this function as
ProximV ar. Therefore, considering above formulation in mind, we arrive at the
following equation for calculating weights.
wj =
1
m∑
i=1
fij
× ProximV ar (3)
Substituting the values obtained by using eq. 3 into the eq. 1, we get the fitness
value of each input. These values are sorted in descending order to select inputs
to be used in next population generation.
In the present study, we use dynamic approach to calculate weights. The
static approach of calculating weights is incomplete in the sense that it only
provides the relation among various ljs. Nevertheless, we need to use another
technique to calculate actual values of weights, for example linear programming
[12]. Dynamic approach, on the other hand, uses runtime statistics to calculate
weights, without requiring to use another technique.
3.3 Selection
We follow elitism approach to select inputs. In this approach, we choose best
two inputs to be included in the next generation i.e. these two inputs will be
competing with their own children in the next generation.
3.4 Crossover and Mutation
We perform crossover by combining two inputs (parents) to form two new inputs
(children). Based on the problem, we may choose single- or two-point crossover.
As our inputs are strings, we concatenate substrings of both the parents by
interchanging them with each other. In experimentations, the rate of crossover
is set to 100%.
Mutation is performed by appending a random (smaller) string which is gen-
erated by providing a regular expression of our choice. For our working example,
we use [ab$&%@12]{4} regular expression, which generate strings of length 4.
We deliberately use smaller character set with special character & as the main
purpose of mutation is to remove stagnation in population by inserting char-
acters (genes) of interest. The point of insertion of new string to the existing
string is decided by uniform probability distribution. We choose following three
positions to insert strings - beginning, middle and end. This operation is also
used to increase the length of the strings as we are targeting BoF type of attack.
The rate of mutation is set between 50 to 70%.
4 Implementation and Experimentation
This section details on implementation of our framework and provides a set of
experiments to validate the approach.
4.1 Implementation
From the implementation perspective, the present work is composed of two major
components- STAC and TAGA. STAC is implemented in Caml, using Frama-C
framework. Details of its implementation can be found in [6]. After the source
code is analyzed by STAC, we get all the information that we require to perform
dynamic analysis. For a given vulnerable statement, we get a set of corresponding
TDSs. We select a TDS which has maximum unique nodes to reach vulnerable
statement. The reason for doing so is that smaller TDS may be very trivial or
may provide less precise path.
Dynamic component TAGA is composed of instrumented binary of the pro-
gram, GA to generate inputs and an interface to communicate with a debugger
to get after-crash information. In this study, we choose to work with GDB as
our preferred debugger. As TDS includes control flow of the program, we get to
know which branch of a conditional statement is executed. This information is
used by our fitness function. Therefore, based on a particular TDS for a par-
ticular vulnerability path, we instrument lines in source code corresponding to
the chosen TDS. For example, for the code given in listing 1.1, one of the TDSs
that we select is 〈21, 5, 7, 8〉 for the vulnerable statement strcpy(bp, login).
Therefore, we instrument statements after each of these labels- 21, 5, 7, 8. In
this way, at runtime, we get execution trace of the program in terms of executed
statement’s frequency.
GA is implemented as Python module. Inputs to GA module are instru-
mented binary and regular expressions to generate inputs. Regular expressions
are constructed based on the static analysis of the program which extract infor-
mation on constraints e.g. character matching in IF statements. Such characters,
along with other ASCII characters, are included in regular expression to help
GA generating valid inputs faster. GA is run until we get SIGSEGV signal or a
predefined iteration threshold is reached (1000 iterations in our experimental
setup). We look for SIGSEGV signal because BoF will result in invalid memory
reference or segmentation fault. Once we get malicious inputs corresponding to
SIGSEGV signal, with the help of another Python module, we run the binary with
GDB to get more information which is useful for understanding the impact of
analysis on exploit generation (see section 4.3). Using such information, we can
infer as how easy (or difficult) it is to write a real exploit for the vulnerability.
4.2 Experimentation
For empirical results, we experiment with Verisec benchmark suite [28]. The suite
consists of snippets of open source programs containing BoF vulnerabilities of
varied difficulties. For us the level of difficulty is directly proportional to the
manipulation done on the tainted input by the program i.e. if there are checks
on the input before it reaches the vulnerable statement, it is more difficult to
generate such input. From this perspective, we find that Verisec suite has pro-
grams as simple as bind-> CVE-2001-001-> nslookupComplain-small bad.c,
gxine-> CVE-2007-0406-> main, Samba-> CVE-2007-0453 etc., wherein gen-
erating a larger random string overflows the buffer, to as hard as sendmail->
CVE-2003-0681-> buildfname, edbrowse-> CVE-2006-6909-> ftpls->
strchr bad.c etc. wherein input should contain (or does not contain) specific
characters (at specific positions) in order to reach the vulnerable statement.
There are many programs which contain BoF vulnerability mainly due to off-
by-one error. We could not experiment with such programs as gcc 4.4.1 compiles
the binaries such that vulnerable buffer does not appear just above the saved
frame pointer (ebp). This makes it impossible to overwrite last byte of saved
ebp which is the technique to exploit off-by-one error [15]. Therefore in practice,
there is no off-by-one error as such and without the dynamic analysis, this would
have been a false positive.
Table 1 shows the findings of our analysis on three programs which do string
(inputs) manipulations before letting it reach the vulnerable statement. In order
to evaluate the gain by including TDS with GA, we compare our results with
two other approaches- random fuzzing approach and code coverage based GA
approach, similar to [13]. However, even for random approach, we use the same
regular expression that we use in our proposed approach to generate the random
inputs i.e. random fuzzing is not completely random. For the second approach,
we use gcov tool for calculating code-coverage. In this case, the fitness function
depends on percentage of code covered by an input and number of times a
vulnerable statement is executed (and therefore, reached). We do not use any
specific path (slicing) to reach vulnerable statement. The weights are selected as
per heuristics discussed in [13].
Table 1. List of the programs used in experimentation
S.No.Application Name #
LoC
Constraints TDS +
GA
coverage
+ GA
Random
inputs
1 sendmail mime fromqp 65 ’=n’ 20 26 243
2 sendmail buildfname 52 ’&’ and
not(,;%)
6 10 34
3 edbrowse ftpls 49 ’-- ’ (in the be-
ginning)
35 * *
In the table, columns 2–3 denote the path of the vulnerable program in the
Verisec suite. lines of code parameter is given in column 4. Column 5 shows
constraints that an input must satisfy in order to reach vulnerable statement.
Column 6 shows the number of iterations (generations) taken by TDS based GA
to generate inputs that crash the application. These numbers are average taken
over 20 different runs of GA. Column 7 shows the same for coverage based GA.
Last column shows the number of iteration taken by random fuzzing approach.
A noticeable difference (shown as asterisk) comes out in the case of edbrowse
program. In this case, out of 20 times, coverage based GA could generate ma-
licious inputs only 3 times and random fuzzing could generate malicious inputs
only 2 times. This comparison shows the effectiveness of GA enabled inputs gen-
eration viz-a-viz randomly generated inputs, specially in the case, when we have
knowledge about the precise path to reach the vulnerable statement by means
of TDS. The experiments also show that even for the small programs, data- and
control-flow assisted GA outperforms other similar approaches3.
4.3 Vulnerability Exploitability
Next step in vulnerability analysis is to check if the vulnerability is exploitable
in real world by generating exploits. Generating exploits for a stack BoF vulner-
ability involves getting information about the execution stack when the buffer
overflow occurs. When we get a SIGSEGV signal on a particular input, another
python module is used to run the program with GDB to collect after-the-crash
information which includes various stack register contents e.g. return pointer,
stack pointer, frame pointer etc., offset of input that caused overflowing saved
return address. The purpose of getting this information is to further validate the
exploitability of the vulnerability (explained below). Following we show a typical
output of our tool for the program at S. No. 3 in the table. In that program, there
exists a BoF when strcpy() is called with a fixed length buffer user[USERSZ]
and user controlled input. In order to reach the strcpy() statement, the in-
put string must have ’-- ’ as first three characters. For convenience, we denote
<space> by S in the output shown in figure 2. Line 2-3 shows the malicious input
3 For larger programs, the cyclomatic complexity will be high which will further widen
the gap.
1 Generation# 35
2 Malicious inputs: --S1--*a%*S--l42f4*cS8SnSaaSaSS%*S1-*%%Sn%1S
3 n1%a-nn*1*nn1a-S%%1-*a1*a*a-a*a-%a-%*Sa1S%1a*nn1--%*l&c%al*cgf=
4 Lengths: 107
5 Calling GDB...Returned from GDB..
6 ....
7 EIP is overwritten by: a*a- at index: 68
8 EBP is overwritten by: *a1* at index: 64
9 ESP is pointing to: a*a-%a-%*Sa1S%1a*nn1--%*l&c%al*cg at index:72
Fig. 2. Output of the tool.
that caused the program to crash, followed by its length 107. Line # 7 shows
the status of eip which is overwritten by a*a- at an offset 68 in the string and
line 9 shows the contents pointed by esp at offset 72. With this information, one
can construct a real exploit with the following skeleton:
<--S...Ax67...><4 bytes address to ’jump esp’ instruction>
<...shellcode..(starting at 72th byte>
Based on this information, we can infer that it is easy to exploit edbrowse
program. On the other hand, in the case of mime fromqp, we find it difficult to
exploit as values of eip, esp were not always affected meaningfully by the user
controlled input which makes it hard to construct an exploit.
5 Related Work
Application code analysis is gaining importance, as it can help in writing safe
code during the development phase by detecting bugs that may lead to vulner-
abilities. As a result, tremendous research on code analysis has been carried out
by industry and academia and there exist many commercial and open source
tools and approaches for this purpose.
Taint Analysis. The notion of taint variable has been introduced within the
Perl language, with the use of a special execution mode called “taint mode”.
This idea of computing variable’s taintness at runtime has been generalized into
several tools, see [7] for a more complete survey. Input dependencies of program
variables can also be computed using static analysis techniques, as in [29,23,26].
The main advantage of the latter approach is to consider the whole set of pro-
gram executions, but, as usual, the price to pay is larger number of false positives.
Moreover, it is highly desirable to extend results on variable taintness with in-
formation on the corresponding execution paths. This point has been considered
so far only in a few existing works [16,21]. The most dangerous paths are then
used as “test objective” in order to check if the corresponding vulnerability is
effective or not. On similar lines, in [10], Ganesh et al. proposed an automated
white-box fuzzing techniques in the form of a tool- BuzzFuzz. The technique is
to identify vulnerable points in the code and execute the instrumented binary
with valid input set; using data taint analysis, identify inputs that affect those
vulnerable points; fuzz these inputs and run the binary with them. In this way,
the legal syntactic structure of the program is maintained while executing it with
new fuzzed inputs. However, a domain expert knowledge is required to fuzz the
relevant inputs manually.
Concolic Approaches. Concolic approach is a portmanteau of concrete and sym-
bolic execution based approaches for analysis. A pure symbolic approach- EXE
is proposed in [4], wherein the program is run on symbolic inputs while recording
input-constraint pairs. When a particular path ends or a bug is found, EXE gen-
erate a real input by solving the constraints by using a solver. The problem with
such approaches is the path explosion and imperfect symbolic execution [11].
Godefroid et al. [11] implement a tool- SAGE which incorporates techniques
from symbolic and dynamic execution. At algorithm level, the approach has
components similar to our approach, specially from GA implementation stand-
point. However, the functionality of these components is different. The idea is
to start with an initial input and capture constraints by executing the program.
These constraints are given to constraint solver. Based on this solution and their
score in covering basic-blocks, new children are generated to cover new paths.
This process is continued until some interesting event is captured. The analy-
sis is performed on machine-code, which makes it suitable for wide variety of
compilers, compiling to x86 instructions.
GA Assisted Dynamic Approaches. Dynamic analysis technique analyzes the
application by executing it on real inputs. Miller et al. coined the term fuzzing
to test UNIX utilities by generating random inputs to discover malfunctioning
[20]. The idea is to generate random values as inputs that covers boundary cases.
But as noted in [4][10], vulnerabilities that are buried deep inside the code are
hard to discover using this technique. Genetic algorithms (GAs) have been used
to generate test cases for program testing [1][19]. Grosso et al. have used GA
to generate inputs automatically that trigger BoF vulnerability in the applica-
tion [12][14]. The fitness score of input is based on its ability to cover code and
reaching vulnerable statements and weights associated with each of these factors.
They have used linear programming to adjust weights automatically which is an
additional step in the whole process of input generation. The authors mention
to consider nested statements, but have not provided enough description of its
detection in source code and usage in the fitness calculation. In our approach,
we have made use of readily available statement frequencies to approximate
nested statements and their weights. Sidewinder is a tool for analyzing binaries
to detect vulnerabilities using GA assisted fuzzer [24]. In this approach, control
flow is modeled as Markov Process and fitness function is defined over Markov
probabilities associated with state transition on control flow graph. Inputs are
generated using grammatical evolution. Due to the dependency of fitness func-
tion on transition probabilities, this approach should be able to reach deeply
nested statements which is important if vulnerable statements are buried deep
inside. Our approach is closest to this approach with added feature of simplifying
the weight calculation and path to traverse to reach vulnerable statements. On
the similar lines, Liu et al. construct control dependence predicate path (CDP-
Path) from the binary of the application and apply GA to construct inputs to
reach vulnerable statements [17]. Their fitness function depends on the number
of predicates in CDPPath covered by inputs. However, this study treats each
predicate equal which may result in stagnation during later stage of searching.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this article, we report our work of generating inputs to reach a vulnerable
statement and putting the program in an abnormal states. Static analysis based
taint data-flow approach has the advantage of producing all possible paths from
tainted inputs to vulnerable statements, but is generally blind towards paths
constraints that must be satisfied by an input to traverse a given path. Symbolic
execution tries to overcome this hurdle by solving path constraints to generate
inputs, but at the cost of high computational complexity. Random fuzzing is
surprisingly effective in generating inputs for corner cases in lesser time. This
approach, however, does not consider any conditions on the inputs, thereby mak-
ing it unsuitable for more complex programs. We, therefore, propose a hybrid
approach by combining static and dynamic analysis to extract nicer properties
of both the approaches. By doing a static analysis, we extract TDS- a program
slice from tainted input to vulnerable statements and string constraints to be
satisfied by the inputs. Rather than solving these constraints, we use GA to gen-
erate inputs along a TDS. The fitness function depends on the runtime behavior
of the program in terms of execution frequencies of statements. This amalga-
mation makes the approach faster and accurate, which is further supported by
empirical results that we obtain on a benchmark dataset.
This paper reports preliminary results of our work. We envisage many im-
provements that comprise our future work. We intend to provide more formal
makeup to frequency spectrum analysis. Another point of difficulty is that when
more conditions are checked in a single IF statement, GA has no way to knowing
up to what percentage of predicates are being satisfied by an input. This makes
it difficult to select inputs for its next generation. Had it been represented by
multiple separate IF statements, GA can observe the respective frequencies of
separate IF statements to select inputs. It should be noted that at binary level,
this structure is available by default. Each condition in a composite IF state-
ment is represented by a separate basic-block. This give us incentive to shift our
static analysis to binary code. We intend to integrate it with a debugger to have
better runtime control. Finally, for a better coverage of all tainted paths to a
vulnerability, we plan to design a fitness function (similar to the one proposed
in [5]) which is based on more than one TDS corresponding to one particular
vulnerable statement.
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